Technological change and the wealth of nations by Gancia, Gino & Zilibotti, Fabrizio
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2009
Technological change and the wealth of nations
Gancia, Gino; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
Abstract: We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technology adoption that
can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differences across countries. In our model, new
technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries.
Our framework is rich enough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriate
technologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-country misallocations across
sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effects of two aspects of globalization, trade in goods
and migration, on the wealth of nations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By
doing so, we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143333
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-26928
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Gancia, Gino; Zilibotti, Fabrizio (2009). Technological change and the wealth of nations. Annual Review
of Economics, 1(1):93-120. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143333
Technological Change and the Wealth of Nations
Gino Ganciayand Fabrizio Zilibottiz
October 6, 2008
Abstract
We discuss a unied theory of directed technological change and technology
adoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity di¤erences
across countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced coun-
tries and di¤use endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is rich
enough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity di¤erences: inappropriate
technologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-country
misallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the e¤ects
of two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth of
nations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so,
we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.
JEL Classication: F43, O11, O31, O33, O38, O41, O43, O47.
Keywords: Barriers to Technology Adoption, Directed Technology Adoption,
Endogenous Growth, Globalization, Human Capital, Inappropriate Technologies,
Market Power, Political Economy, Skill-biased Technical Change, TFP di¤erences.
1 Introduction
There is little disagreement that the unprecedented growth in material well-being expe-
rienced by Western countries over the past two centuries was made possible by crucial
improvements in technology. Since the outset of the Industrial Revolution, pathbreaking
innovations like the steam engine, the spinning machine, gas-lighting, electricity and the
telegraph, opened the door to a trajectory of sustained technological change. While
creating prosperity in some countries, the era of modern economic growth also led to
the appearance of enormous disparities in the wealth of nations. Di¤erences in income
per capita between the richest and the poorest region in the world were a modest 3:1 in
1820 and became as large as 18:1 in 2001. Disparities across countries are far greater:
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although they cannot easily be tracked back in time, in 2003, income per capita in the
richest country (Luxembourg) was 143 times higher than in the poorest (Liberia).
Despite the obvious importance of technology in explaining modern growth and in
shaping the world income distribution, quantifying the exact contribution of technical
progress is not a simple task. The main di¢ culty is that technological progress is hard
to observe and measure directly. To circumvent this problem, a useful starting point
is the exercise of development accounting. It consists in choosing a functional form
for the aggregate production function and use cross-country data on inputs and output
to decompose di¤erences in income per capita into di¤erences in factor endowments
(human and physical capital) and di¤erences in total factor productivity (TFP). The
goal of this decomposition is to shed light on the relative importance of productivity in
explaining the di¤erential performance of countries. The standard approach (see, e.g.,
Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005)) postulates that output per capita, y, can be
represented by the following Cobb-Douglas function:
y = Akh1 ; (1)
where k is capital per worker, h is average human capital per worker,  is a constant
equal to the capital share, and A is TFP. Having data on the observables (y; k; h; ) ;
one can compute A as a residual. Next, one can decompose the variance of y into the
contribution of factor accumulation and technology. The usual result in the literature is
that di¤erences in endowments, i.e. the factor kh1 , only account for less than 50%
of the observed disparities in income per capita.1 In other words, TFP seems to be the
main source of income di¤erences.
In addition, convergence in measured TFP accounts for a large fraction of the changes
in the wealth of nations. Take two success stories: China and the Republic of Korea. In
1970, the aggregate TFP of China was less than 12% of that of the United States. In
2003, it was over 38%. In Korea, a country that started its process of fast convergence
earlier, TFP was 36% of that of the United States in 1960, 46% in 1970 and 61% in 2003.
In contrast, there has been no convergence in most Sub-Saharan African countries. For
instance, Kenyas relative TFP was 25% (twice as high as that of China!) in 1970 and
only 21% in 2003. Similarly, Niger relative TFP was 31% in 1970 and 23% in 2003.2
The development accounting exercise has intrinsic limitations. First, it identies
technology with an unexplained residual, and second it does not identify any ultimate
cause for the observed variation in endowments and technology. Thus, while it provides
evidence on the central role of productivity, it is mute about the nature of TFP di¤erences
as well as about the relationship between h, k and A. Both economic theory and the
positive empirical correlation between productivity and factor endowments (especially
between human capital and TFP) suggest all factors (k; h; A) to be endogenous and
1For example, Caselli (2005) nds that var

log
 
kh1 

=var [log (y)] = 0:39:
2The data of GDP per worker are from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. Human capi-
tal per worker is dened using the average years of schooling in Barro and Lee (2000 and update
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html), a 10% annual rate of return to schooling. The es-
timate of human capital per capita in 2003 is based on the data for year 2000. The estimates of capital
stock are from Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001). We set  = 1=3 as customary.
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interlinked. For instance, both China and Korea experienced capital deepening and large
improvements in the educational attainment as well as fast convergence. In contrast,
neither Kenia nor Niger experienced capital deepening or technological change. Thus,
it would be hazardous to infer deep causes of income di¤erences from development
accounting. Is the lack of human capita responsible for low levels of productivity? Are
di¤erences in complementary factors (human capital and TFP) what prevents capital
per worker to be equalized across countries?
More recent studies have made some progress towards answering these questions.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) take the accounting exercise beyond its static perspec-
tive by explicitly allowing for endogenous physical and human capital accumulation.
They propose an alternative decomposition of cross-country income disparities into three
components: the distance of a country from its steady state, the steady state level a
country is converging to, and residual productivity. To implement this decomposition,
they use a calibrated neoclassical growth model where distortions to investments in both
physical and human capital are chosen in order to match the observed pattern of sav-
ing rates and educational attainments. Their ndings reinforce the basic message of the
development accounting exercise, in the sense that a slow speed of convergence (i.e.,
the distance form the steady-state) contributes little to explaining cross-country income
di¤erences. For instance, even if non OECD countries could converge immediately to
their steady state, they would ll a mere 15% of their income gap relative to the US
economy. Distortions that lower the steady-state level of human and physical capital
instead account for about 28% of output di¤erences, still leaving the lions share, almost
58%, to unmeasured productivity.
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) provides further evidence on the source of cross-country
di¤erences in capital-labor ratios. They compute the marginal product of capital (MPK)
for a large cross section of countries and nd that, despite the huge variation in capital-
labor ratios, MPK is remarkably similar. This result is interesting because it implies that
capital is allocated e¢ ciently across countries. To show this, they dene the marginal
product of reproducible capital, MPKr, as:
MPKr = ry=kr;
where kr is reproducible capital and r is its income share. Although the overall cap-
ital share  is thought to be approximately constant across countries, less developed
countries have a much larger share of agriculture and natural resource sectors that are
intensive in non-reproducible capital. It follows that in poor countries r is particularly
low. This correction (using r instead of ) turns out to be very important to obtain
the result that MPKr is almost equalized. Next, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that
lower capital labor ratios in poor countries are largely attributable to low endowments
of human capital and low productivity. Once again, these ndings suggest that di¤er-
ences in capital endowments are a consequence rather than a cause of underdevelopment
and that computing productivity as a residual in an accounting exercise may actually
underestimate its role in explaining income di¤erences.
In this paper, we construct a model that focuses on factor-biased (directed) tech-
nological change and use it as a workhorse to analyze a variety of interacting factors
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that explain persistent di¤erences in the wealth of nations. We rst argue, following
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), that since new technologies are developed by rich coun-
tries (the North) these technologies tend to be inappropriate for the factor endowments
of poor countries. This mismatch between technologies and factor endowment in poor
countries is a source of productivity di¤erences. Moreover, we claim that the nature of
recent technological development may have accentuated the importance of this channel.
For instance, many less developed countries have a scarce endowment of skilled workers
that are required to operate computer-intensive technologies. This reduces the positive
impact of the IT revolution on their productivity widening the gap in the wealth of
nations.
While Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) assume that technologies can be copied and
adopted instantaneously, in the real world the di¤usion of technologies across countries
occurs slowly. This is partly due to physiological factor (e.g., new technologies embed
some tacit knowledge or need to be adapted to local conditions). However, barriers to
technology adoption may also have politico-economic roots, as argued among others by
Parente and Prescott (1994 and 2000) and Krusell and Rios Rull (1997). Our model
uncovers some of these politico-economic factors, focusing in particular on the after-
math of a skill-biased technological wave. We show that due to the skill bias of foreign
technologies, the adoption of technologies developed in the North may harm incumbent
rms and unskilled workers in the South, inducing them lobby for barriers that slowdown
adoption. Competition policy is one of the most prominent policies a¤ecting technology
adoption. In the spirit of recent papers see, e.g., Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006)
and Zilibotti (2008) an extension of our model shows that the optimal competition
policy may change at di¤erent stages of the process of technological convergence. Both
political barriers against technology adoptions and inappropriate competition policies
can thus contribute to the persistent productivity di¤erences.
In another application, we extend the analysis to the e¤ects of asymmetric policy dis-
tortions, e.g., sector-specic industrial policies inducing di¤erent market power across
sectors. Such policies open wedges that distort the direction of technological devel-
opment and adoption. Our argument is related to a growing literature arguing that
resource misallocations within countries may be a major culprit for the persistent low
productivity in poor countries. Important contributions in this line of research include
works by Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000), Banerjee and Duo (2005), Restuccia
and Rogerson (2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2008).
Finally, we return to the benchmark model and analyze how globalization, undoubt-
edly one of the most important phenomenon of recent years, may a¤ect the wealth of
nations through its impact on the direction of technological progress. To this end, we
open the model to international trade and labor mobility (migration). One important
result of this section is to show that, as argued by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Epifani and Gancia (2008a), globalization can lead to skill-biased technical change that
benets disproportionately skill-abundant countries. A second set of results obtains
when countries are specialized in the production of di¤erentiated goods. Within this
framework, we discuss the point made by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) that trade can
4
promote technological convergence across countries through changes in relative prices
(the terms of trade). Finally, we show that, depending on parameter values, the endoge-
nous reaction of technology can turn migration into an either equalizing or unequalizing
force. The latter nding allows us to make contact with a long tradition of models
in which globalization can trigger a cumulative process of uneven development (e.g.,
Matsuyama (1995 and 2004) and Krugman and Venables, (1995)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model of en-
dogenous technical change. Section 3 introduces technology di¤usion and uses the model
as a workhorse to explore three sets of explanations for cross-country productivity dif-
ferences: inappropriate technologies, barriers to technology adoption (and their origins),
misallocation of resources across sectors. Section 4 introduces trade in goods and im-
perfect labor mobility. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we present the workhorse model of endogenous technical change. The
benchmark model is a simplied version of Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2008) in
turn related to Acemoglu (1998, 2002), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and
Zilibotti (2005). The key ingredients are di¤erent types of labor, skilled and unskilled
workers, and factor-biased (directed) technical progress. To simplify the analysis, we
abstract from physical capital accumulation. We emphasize an asymmetry in the ability
of countries to "choose" technologies: new technologies are developed by rich countries
(the North) and sold in their markets only, while new technologies need a costly invest-
ment to be adopted - possibly with delay - by less developed countries (the South). In
this leader-follower approach, the South benets from the innovation in the North but
is also subject to a constraint on its ability to choose the appropriate factor bias of tech-
nology. We characterize rst the equilibrium in the North, which can be interpreted as
a large advanced country (or a collection of perfectly integrated advanced countries). In
the next section, we model how technologies di¤use to a set of less developed countries
(the South) and discuss sources of productivity di¤erences.
2.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by innitely lived agents who derive utility from consumption
ct and supply labor inelastically. Preferences of the representative agent are given by
the utility function:
U =
Z 1
0
e t log ctdt;
where  is the discount factor. The representative agent sets a consumption plan to
maximize utility, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a No-Ponzi game
condition. The consumption plan satises a standard Euler equation:
_ct
ct
= rt   ; (2)
where rt is the interest rate. We remove henceforth time indexes when this causes no
confusion.
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2.2 Technology and Market Structure
Final output, used for both consumption and investment, is given by a CES aggregator
Y =
h
Y
 1

L + Y
 1

H
i 
 1
; (3)
where YL and YH are goods produced with unskilled labor, L, and skilled labor, H,
respectively, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between them. Maximizing Y
under a resource constraint gives the relative demand function:
PH
PL
=

YL
YH
 1

(4)
where PL and PH are the prices of YL and YH , respectively. As usual, we take Y to be
the numeràire:
P 1 L + P
1 
H = 1: (5)
The production function at the sector level is:
YL = EL
Z AL
0
yL (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
and YH = EH
Z AH
0
yH (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
where AL (AH) is the measure of intermediate inputs, yL (i) (yH (i)), produced with
unskilled labor L (skilled labor H). As in standard expanding-variety models à la
Romer (1990), the range of available intermediates captures the state of technologi-
cal sophistication that grows (endogenously) with innovation. The term EL  (AL)
 2
 1
(EH  (AH)
 2
 1 ) is an externality that pins down the degree of increasing returns con-
sistent with the existence of a balanced growth path.3 Producers of YL and YH are
competitive and maximize prots taking the price of intermediates, pL (i) and pH (i), as
parametric. This yields the demand equations:
yL (i)
yL (j)
=

pL (j)
pL (i)

and
yH (i)
yH (j)
=

pH (j)
pH (i)

: (6)
The intermediate good sector is monopolistic, with each producer owning the patent
for a single variety. Note that intermediate rms are monopolist in their own product
market, but behave competitively in the labor market since there they compete with a
large number of rms. The production function for each intermediate input, yL (i) and
yH (i), is linear in the type of labor employed,
yL (i) = l (i) and yH (i) = Zh (i) ;
3Note that the externality is not needed for the special case  = 2. In the typical formulation used
in the literature without the term E and with  6= 2 (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991), balanced
growth can be obtained by imposing an externality in the R&D technology. Having the externality in
the production function is no less general and simplies the analysis substantially.
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and is subject to the resource constraints
R AL
0
l (i) di  L and R AH
0
h (i) di  H;where
L and H are in xed supply. The parameter Z > 1 will ensure that the equilibrium skill
premium is positive. As all monopolists face a demand curve with the constant price
elasticity of , it is optimal for them to set a price equal to
pL (i) = pL =

1  1

 1
wL and pH (i) = pH =

1  1

 1
wH
Z
; (7)
where wL and wH are the wage of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. This pricing
formula also implies that prots per rm are a fraction 1= of revenues:
L (i) =
pLl (i)

and H (i) =
pHZh (i)

(8)
Using symmetry and labor market clearing yields l (i) = L=AL and h (i) = H=AH ,
which in turn allows to express sectorial output as:
YL = ALL and YH = AHZH: (9)
Note that output in each sector is a linear function of labor and the measure of available
intermediates, capturing the state of technology. Using these into (4) yields the relative
price:
PH
PL
=

ALL
AHZH
 1

: (10)
Relative wages and prots can be found from (7), (8), noting that pLL = PLYL and
pHZH = PHYH . This yields:
wH
wL
 ! = PHZAH
PLAL
=

ZAH
AL
1  1


L
H
 1

(11)
H
L
=
PHZH
PLL
=

AH
AL
  1


ZH
L
1  1

; (12)
where use has been made of (10). Equation (12) shows that the relative protability,
H=L, has two components: a price e¤ect, whereby rents are higher in sectors pro-
ducing more expensive goods, and a market size e¤ect, whereby rents are higher in
bigger sectors.
2.3 Endogenous Technological Change
Innovation takes the form of the introduction of new varieties of intermediate inputs and
is directed. In particular, we assume that the development of a new variety in sector H
(L) requires a xed cost of H (L) units of the numeràire Y . For simplicity we assume
that H = L = : The direction of innovation is endogenous, i.e., each innovator can
decide to design either a L- or a H- complement new variety. As patents are innitely
lived, the value of a rm either VL or VH is the present discounted value of its future
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prot stream. Free entry implies that neither VL nor VH can exceed the innovation cost,
. Since in a balanced growth path PL, PH and the interest rate r are constant, then:
VL =
L
r
and VH =
H
r
:
In order for the relative price to remain constant, AL and AH must grow at the same
rate, which in turns requires innovators to be indi¤erent between developing an L- or H-
complement input. Thus, VL = VH = , which requires in turn that H=L = 1. Then,
equation (12) yields the skill bias of technology (AH=AL) compatible with balanced
growth:4
AH
AL
=

ZH
L
 1
: (13)
From (11), the associated skill premium is:
! = Z 1

H
L
 2
: (14)
To nd the growth rate of the economy, we note that along the balanced growth path
the interest rate is pin down by any of the two free entry conditions:
r =
H

=
PHZH

(15)
Solving for PH from (5) yields:
PH =
"
1 +

PH
PL
 1#1=( 1)
: (16)
Using (16) together with (10), (13) and (15) we obtain an expression for r that can
be substituted into the Euler equation (2) to solve for the balanced growth rate of the
economy, g:
g = r    =

L 1 + (ZH) 1
 1
 1

  : (17)
3 Directed Technology Adoption
In this section, we extend the benchmark model to incorporate technology adoption in
developing countries and use it as a workhorse to explore di¤erent explanations for the
persistence of productivity di¤erences across countries.
Consider a less developed country, called the South. We assume the South to be
skill scarce relative to the North (HS=LS < HN=LN) and to have a population size no
larger than that of the North (HN + LN  HS + LS). The South can adopt, at a cost
specied below, the technologies developed in the North. Except for these di¤erences,
4It can be shown that, from any initial state of the technology, the economy will converge monoton-
ically to (13).
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the North and the South are identical. We also assume that there is no trade in goods
and no international protection of intellectual property. The former assumption will be
relaxed in Section 4.1. The latter implies that innovators in the North cannot sell their
copyrights to rms located in the South, so that the only market they have access to
is the domestic one (see Diwan and Rodrik (1991) for an empirical motivation of this
assumption). In the absence of trade, the equilibrium conditions (2)-(17) in the North
are una¤ected by the presence of the South.
In the South, equilibrium conditions analogous to those in the North also apply, but
the equilibrium technology takes a di¤erent form, as the South can adopt innovations
developed in the North. In particular, the South takes the state of technology in the
North, ANL and A
N
H , as given. Technology adoption is modeled as a costly investment
activity that is similar to innovation. Following Nelson and Phelps (1966), Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) we assume that, due
to technological spillovers, the cost of adopting a technology in a sector, cL and cH , is a
negative function of the technological gap in that sector:5
cL = 
S

ASL
ANL

and cH = S

ASH
ANH

;   0 (18)
where S   (the South is less e¢ cient than the North at innovating) and ANL and
ANH represent the world technology frontiers in the two sectors. That is, the farther
behind is a country relative to the North in a given sector, the cheaper it is to adopt
technologies in that sector. With this formulation, the total cost of adopting the entire
set of z-complement technologies (with z 2 fH; Lg) is:
S
Z ANz
0

ASz
ANz

dASz =
SANz
1 + 
:
This expression shows that  can be interpreted as an inverse measure of barriers to
technology adoption in the South.
The fact that the cost of adoption is positive (albeit arbitrarily small if  ! 1)
implies that once a rm adapt a new intermediate input to the South, it is not protable
for any others to do so. Otherwise, Bertrand competition between sellers of the same
intermediate would lead to negative prots. Hence, all intermediate inputs adopted in
the South are sold by local monopolists.
In a balanced growth equilibrium, free entry implies
H
L
=
cH
cL
; (19)
where cH and cL are given by (18), and depend on the distance to the technology frontier
in the respective sector. Then, using equations (12), (18) and (19), we can solve for the
skill bias of the technology in the South:
ASH
ASL
=

ZHS
LS
  1
1+

ANH
ANL
 
1+
=
"
ZHS
LS

ZHN
LN
#  11+
: (20)
5See Coe, Helpman and Ho¤maister (2008) for empirical evidence on technological spillovers.
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Technology adoption in the South depends on the skill endowment in the North and in
the South. On the one hand, a high skill-endowment in the South translates into a strong
incentive to adopt skill-complement innovations.6 On the other, a high skill-endowment
in the North means that skill-complement innovations are relatively abundant and there-
fore relatively cheap to adopt. Note also that the skill-bias of the Southern technology,
ASH=A
S
L, is increasing in , capturing the speed of technology transfer. In particular:
1. If  = 0 (prohibitive barriers) the South develops technologies independently from
the North: ASH=A
S
L =
 
ZHS=LS
 1
;
2. If  ! 1 adoption is free (no barriers) so that the South is using the technology
of the North: ASH=A
S
L = A
N
H=A
N
L .
It is easy to show that, in a balanced growth path, the South grows at the same rate
g as the North and the two countries have the same interest rate, even in the absence
of trade or factor mobility.
We use this model of technology adoption to explore the three explanations for
North-South productivity di¤erences discussed in the introduction:
1. Technology inappropriateness;
2. Barriers to technology adoption and inappropriate competition policies;
3. Ine¢ ciencies arising from distortions which create a wedge between social and
private productivity of investments in innovation/technology adoption.
To illustrate (1) and (2), it will prove useful to focus on the transitional dynamics as-
sociated with a shock inducing skill-biased technical progress. This exercise is interesting
also because skill-biasedness has been argued to be an important feature of technological
progress in the last quarter of the XXth century (an example being the IT revolution,
see, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998)). Following
Acemoglu (1998), we model the shock as an exogenous increase in the skill supply of
the region of the world where technical change originates (the North). Alternatively,
we could consider the unexpected emergence of a new general purpose technology such
as information technology (see, e.g., Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) and Aghion and
Howitt (1998)), that reduces the cost of innovation of the skilled sector. Both shocks
would induces skill-biased technical change in the North: since H=H > L=L, AH
grows and AL remains constant during the transition. We study the implications of this
shock and the ensuing transition on cross-country productivity di¤erences, on the one
hand, and on within-country income distribution, on the other hand. As we shall see,
the latter may be responsible of lobbying activities to block technology adoption.
6Caselli and Wilson (2004) provide evidence that countries import technologies that complement
their abundant factors.
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3.1 Inappropriate Technologies
Even if countries have access to the same technologies ( !1; implying that ASH=ASL =
ANH=A
N
L = AH=AL), technologies developed in rich countries may not be appropriate
for the needs of poor countries. The reason is that there might be a technology-skill
mismatch: when the South is using technologies that are designed for the North economy,
it may lack the skill endowment required to operate them optimally. For example, very
poor countries with low literacy rates may lack the skills that are necessary to benet
fully from the IT revolution.
To address this point formally, we start by showing that if technical change originates
entirely in the North its direction is e¢ cient from the viewpoint of the North itself. An
e¢ cient allocation maximizes the PDV utility of the representative consumer, given by
U0 =
Z 1
0
e t log
h
Yt   

_ALt + _AHt
i
dt;
where aggregate output can be written - substituting (9) into (3)- as:
Yt =
h
(ALtL)
 1
 + (ZAHtH)
 1

i 
 1
: (21)
Standard analysis shows that since the marginal cost of innovation is the same across sec-
tors, an e¢ cient direction of technical change equalizes the marginal product of technol-
ogy across sectors i.e., the technology maximizes output. Di¤erentiating (21) yields:7
@Y
AL
= Y
1
L
 1
 (AL)
 1
 and
@Y
AH
= Y
1
 (ZH)
 1
 (AH)
 1
 :
Thus:
@Y
AL
=
@Y
AH
, AH
AL
=

ZH
L
 1
which coincides with the equilibrium skill-bias in the North of equation (13). Hence, the
direction of technology is optimal for the Northern skill-composition.
An immediate implication is that if less developed countries use the technology origi-
nating from the North, but have a di¤erent relative skill endowment, HN=LN 6= HS=LS,
then AH=AL 6=
 
HS=LS
 1
: Thus, the marginal product of technology will not be equal-
ized in the South and the productivity of the South will be below the level that would
be attained if it could chose its technological bias. To see this, dene the productivity
per e¤ective unit of labor as y  Y= (ZH + L) and consider how the productivity gap
varies with the skill bias in the technology:
yN
yS
=
ZHS + LS
ZHN + LN
2641 +

AH
AL
ZHN
LN
  1

1 +

AH
AL
ZHS
LS
  1

375

 1
:
7Note that this condition does not concern the amount of innovation which is suboptimally too
low but only its direction.
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The right-hand side expression is an increasing function of AH=AL, because the North
is assumed to be skill-abundant. This shows that the skill bias of technology magnies
the productivity di¤erence. Note also that the skill-technology mismatch disappears as
! 1. This reects the well-know fact that, when the aggregate production function is
Cobb-Douglas ( = 1), the factor-bias of technology is irrelevant.
The analysis of this section suggests an alternative approach to the empirical ques-
tions discussed in the introduction. The development accounting literature attributes
productivity di¤erences due to di¤erences in technologies that are captured by di¤erent
levels of the TFP parameter in the aggregate production function (1). To assess the
importance of inappropriate technologies, one can instead assume that all countries use
the same technologies, but that the skill bias of the aggregate technology reects the
direction of technological progress in the North. For instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) consider a model that has a reduced-form representation similar to the one dis-
cussed in this section, but allow for di¤erences in capital-labor ratios. In particular,
their aggregate production is
Y = K
h
(ALL)
 1
 + (ZAHH)
 1

i (1 )
 1
;
where, in their model,  = 2: They set  = 1=3, and replace K;L and H by the country-
specic level in a particular year. Finally, they calibrate Z;AH and AL so as to match
the skill premium in the US, and assume them to have the same value in all countries
- implying that all countries use the same technologies but the skill bias of technologies
is determined by the factor endowment of the US. They nd that their model can
explain up to 50% of the observed cross-country productivity di¤erences. Reducing the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor improves further the t of the model
(see Caselli 2005). These results suggest that technological inappropriateness may be
quantitatively important in explaining productivity di¤erences.
It is also interesting to see how economies respond to a shock inducing skill-biased
technical change (e.g., an increase in HN). Figure 1 summarizes the main features
of the transition for a case in which  > 2. The economy is initially in a balanced
growth equilibrium, where AH and AL grow at the same rate. Since the South imports
costlessly the technologies invented in the North, ANH = A
S
H = AH and A
N
L = A
S
L = AL.
At time t0, there is an unexpected increase in HN . As the shock occurs, AL stops
growing whereas the growth rate of AH increases discontinuously. During the transition,
the growth rate of AH slows down, as the resulting fall in the relative price PH=PL
reduces protability in the skilled sector and increases protability in the unskilled
sector. Eventually, innovation is restored in both sector, and the new balanced growth
features higher growth. The intermediate panel shows the dynamics of the skill premium
in the North and in the South. At t0, the skill premium falls in the North. However,
thereafter the skill premium starts to rise in both countries. Since  > 2, inequality
increases in the long run both in the North and in the South. Yet, the growth in
inequality is more pronounced in the South, where the relative skill endowment has
not changed. Finally, the lower panel shows that skill-biased technical change increases
permanently the productivity gap between the North and the South.
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FIGURE 1 HERE
3.2 Barriers to Technology Adoption
In the previous section, we have assumed that the South can adopt technologies invented
in the North at essentially no cost. Although this was useful to isolate the e¤ect of
technology inappropriateness, the assumption that technologies di¤use immediately is
clearly not realistic. First, new technologies embed some tacit knowledge that cannot
be acquired instantaneously. Second, there are specic local features that may require
costly adaptation of foreign technologies. Third, there are often institutional and policy
barriers that limit technology di¤usion. To analyze these issues, we consider in this
section the general case in which technology adoption is costly ( <1). The theory will
be used to highlight distributional implications of technology adoption in the South that
may lie behind incentives to erect barriers against adoption. To this aim, we assume that
the government in the South can a¤ect the parameter  through regulations on the use
of foreign technologies. Setting as low barriers as possible (high ) fosters technology
adoption and overall productivity growth in the South. However, importing foreign
technologies may harm some groups of workers in particular, as we will see, low-skill
workers and incumbent monopolists in the South.
3.2.1 Workers
Consider, rst, the e¤ects of  on wages. The skill premium in the South can be obtained
from substituting the expression of ASH=A
S
L in (20) into the formula for the skill premium,
(11):
wSH
wSL
= Z
(+1)( 1)
+1

HS
LS
   2
1+

ANH
ANL
 ( 1)
1+
= Z 1

HS
LS
   2
1+

ZHN
LN
 ( 1)2
1+
: (22)
The second equality follows from (13), recalling that ANH=A
N
L is determined by the factor
endowment in the North. As HS=LS < HN=LN ; the skill premium increases with 
showing that more technology transfer increases wage inequality. This e¤ect can cause
the surge of political pressure to raise barriers against technology adoption because,
for instance, inequality may trigger social unrest or can make the middle class (H)
powerful enough to threat the incumbent government. Note that the unequalizing e¤ect
is decreasing in HS=LS: Thus, countries with higher educational attainments and less
inequality may be subject to less political pressure against technology adoption, and
this can contribute further to attain a higher productivity. Therefore, the mechanism
analyzed in this section reinforces the results of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) that
in Southern countries skill-abundance reduces the TFP gap by reducing the mismatch
between skills and technology.
Consider, next, the e¤ect of a transition triggered by an increase in HN . The reper-
cussion in the South is a fall in cH=cL; whose e¤ects on the technology bias are qualita-
tively similar to those observed in the North and visualized in Figure 1: the adoption
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of unskilled technologies is temporarily suspended and, during the transition, the South
imports only skilled technologies. Since ASL does not grow, wage inequality increases
sharply, and more so the larger the elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-
skilled labor. Eventually, wage inequality settles down at a higher steady-state level.
In contrast, consider a policy response to the shock that blocks the introduction of
foreign technology, i.e., it sets  = 0: The transitional dynamics are in this case opposite.
Before the shock, the following balanced-growth condition holds for the South
1 =
H=cH
L=cL
=

ASH
ASL
  1


ZHS
LS
1  1


ANH
ASH
ASL
ANL

:
As the third term in parenthesis on the right-hand side is larger than unity, a policy
reducing  would imply H=cH < L=cL: Thus, switching to autarky in innovation
would induce unskill-biased technical change: ASL would grow whereas A
S
H would remain
constant until a new balanced-growth equilibrium is reached. In the new balanced
growth, the skill premium is low. Thus, the barriers would benet unskilled workers,
at least in the short run. Note that in the extreme case in which  = 0 and S > ;
prohibitive barriers would cause divergence between the North and the South. Therefore,
in the long run all factors would loose. Yet, to the extent to which future consumption
is discounted, low-skill workers may still support barriers.
Although our discussion has focused on a particular episode (an exogenous increase
in HN), the thrust of the argument applies more generally. For instance, if the South
had prohibitive barriers in place to start with, opening the sluice gate of technology
transfer would halt temporarily the growth of ASL and accelerate that of A
H
L : Along
the transition, the South would only import skilled technology and witness an increase
in wage inequality. This may explain why  contrary to the prediction of standard
trade models developing countries that become more open often experience increasing
inequality. To the extent to which economic reforms increase not only the trade of goods
but also the transfer of technology, their e¤ect can be to increase inequality.
3.2.2 Incumbent monopolist rms
So far, we have considered the e¤ect of technology adoption on wages, and the possibility
that low-skill workers may lose from the adoption of foreign technologies. In reality, the
political strength of low-skill industrial workers while varying from country to country
is often limited in developing nations. A more politically empowered group that may
resist to the introduction of new technologies is local incumbent monopolists. We now
turn the attention to these rms.
Before starting the analysis, we note that standard endogenous growth models with
expanding variety and no directed technical change such as Romer (1990) predict
no e¤ects of innovation on incumbent rms. In such models the entry of new rms does
not a¤ect the value of incumbents, due to the knife-edge properties of the Dixit-Stiglitz
production function. Although our model does assume Dixit-Stiglitz technologies, the
price e¤ect associated with the direction of technical change has an impact on the value
of incumbent rms leading to interesting politico-economic predictions. The e¤ects of
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innovation on the value of incumbent rms tend to be asymmetric. When a shock
triggers a transition through a change in relative prices, the value of rms in one sector
falls. However, the value of incumbent rms in the sector potentially beneting from the
price change remains constant: rents are dissipated due to the entry of new rms. There
is no counterpart to this entry process in the sector su¤ering an adverse price change,
since there rms cannot exit and recover sunk costs. The change in prices must then
lead to a temporary fall in the prots of these rms.
As in the previous section, we consider the e¤ects of an unanticipated increase of
HN . In the North, if the number of rms remained constant, the increase in the skill
endowment would increase the protability of incumbent rms in the H sector. This is
known in the literature as a "market size e¤ect". However, the entry of new rms o¤sets
this e¤ect and keeps the prot ow of incumbent rms in the H sector constant. The
value of monopolists remains equal to V NH = . In contrast, the prot of incumbents
in the L sector falls, causing V NL < . During the transition, the entry of rms in the
skilled sector increases PL, raising the value of rms in the L sector until this eventually
returns to .
In the South, the value of all incumbent rms falls permanently creating a motive for
existing rms to lobby for barriers against technology adoption. To show this, consider
the prot ows in the two sectors. These are given by, respectively8
SL =
P SLL
S

=
LS

"
1 +

P SL
P SH
 1# 1 1
=
LS

"
1 +

ZASHH
S
ASLL
S
  1

# 1
 1
; (23)
SH =
P SHZH
S

=
ZHS

"
1 +

P SH
P SL
 1# 1 1
=
ZHS

"
1 +

ASH
ASL
ZHS
LS
   1

# 1
 1
: (24)
Note that the prot ow of rms in the low-skill (high-skill) sector is increasing (decreas-
ing) in the skill bias of the technology (ASH=A
S
L). In turn, the skill bias of the technology
is increasing in both HN=LN and HS=LS (see equation (20)). Thus, the prot ow
of rms in the low-skill sector is higher in the new balanced-growth equilibrium, since
HN=LN is larger than in the initial equilibrium. The prot ow of rms in the high-skill
sector is instead lower in the new balanced-growth equilibrium. Recall, however, that
the steady-state value of rms equals SL=r and 
S
H=r, respectively in the two sectors.
The interest rate increases unambiguously, due to the market-size e¤ect (see equation
(17)).9 Thus, VH necessarily falls, while the sign of the change of VL is in principle am-
biguous, since both SL and r increase. However, the apparent ambiguity can be resolved
8These expressions are obtained using (8), (16) and (10).
9Note that r is the same in the North and in the South in a balanced growth equilibrium in spite of
no trade. The interest rate is instead generally di¤erent during transitions.
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to conclude that VL is also lower in the new steady state. To see why, note that10
V SL = 
LS
LN
26641 +

HS=LS
HN=LN
 ( 1)(1+)
1+

ZHN
LN
 1
1 +

ZHN
LN
 1
3775
1
 1
: (25)
The analysis of (25) shows that V SL is decreasing in H
N=LN .
To undertand this result, recall that in a balanced-growth equilibrium V SL = cL =
S
 
ASL=A
N
L

and V SH = cH = 
S
 
ASH=A
N
H

: Thus, the fall in the value of Southern
rms reects the fact that the distance of the South from the technology frontier in-
creases in all sectors. This is intuitive, as skilled-biased technical change increases the
mismatch between the technologies invented in the North and the factor endowment of
the South. However, the current section enlightens the fact that the e¤ect of the tech-
nology mismatch on the productivity gap can be magnied by politico-economic forces
creating a push for raising barriers to technology adoption.11
3.3 Market Power, Growth and Development
Innovation and technology transfer may also be slowed down by inappropriate policies
that regulate the degree of competition between rms. The extent to which incumbent
rms should be granted market power on their own product line is a classical theme
in the endogenous growth literature. To address it formally, let us return to equation
(7). A monopolist in the low-skill sector charges a price pL = (1  1=) 1wL: Now,
assume that there exists a competitive fringe of rms that can copy the technology and
produce the same intermediate good. But this fringe faces higher costs of production, and
needs (1  1=~) 1 workers to produce one unit of the intermediate, where (1  1=) 1 
(1  1=~) 1 > 1: The parameter ~ captures both technological factors and government
regulation a¤ecting entry. In this generalization, the competitive fringe will not be active
in equilibrium, but will force the monopolist to charge a limit price equal to the marginal
cost of the fringe:
pL =

1  1
~
 1
wL: (26)
Thus, a lower ~ corresponds to a less competitive market, and setting ~ =  corresponds
to the unconstrained monopoly (maximum market power).
10The steady-state value of a rm is given by V SL = 
S
L=r: Using (23) to eliminate 
S
L and (17) to
eliminate r; and simplifying terms, yields:
V SL =
SL
r
= 
LS
LN
26641 +

ASH
ASL
ZHS
LS
  1

1 +

ZHN
LN
 1
3775
1
 1
= 
LS
LN
26641 +

HS=LS
HN=LN
 ( 1)(1+)
1+

ZHN
LN
 1
1 +

ZHN
LN
 1
3775
1
 1
:
Finally, using (20) to eliminate ASH=A
S
L yields (25).
11A shock decreasing HN=LN would have an opposite long-run e¤ect: the value of all incumbent
rms in the South would be higher in the new steady state characterized by a lower mismatch and a
smaller technology gap.
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Monopoly power is traditionally associated with an ine¢ cient resource allocation,
as monopolists set prices di¤erent from marginal costs and underproduce. Thus, sta-
tic e¢ ciency would be achieved by setting ~ ! 1: However, since the early 1990s,
the endogenous growth literature has emphasized that the appropriation of monopoly
rents is key to provide rms with the incentive to make innovative investments. Conse-
quently, the growth literature has advocated a strong protection of intellectual property
rights, although this view has been recently challenged (see Boldrin and Levine (2008)).
The empirical evidence is ambiguous. For instance, Aghion et al. (2005) nd a non-
monotonic relationship between market power and innovation. They rationalize their
ndings in a model where innovation is maximized when pre-innovation rents are small
and post-innovation rents are large. Increasing competition has a stronger e¤ect on pre-
innovation rents when competition is initially low - so a pro-competitive reform fosters
innovation. In contrast, increasing competition in an already highly competitive envi-
ronment e.g., where incumbent rms are operating at similar technological levels 
a¤ects more signicantly post-innovation rents and reduces innovation.
As in standard endogenous growth model, our benchmark model predicts that the
growth rate is maximized by granting monopolists the maximum power, i.e., setting
~ = : Furthermore, there is no static ine¢ ciency in our model due to the inelastic
supply of labor and to the fact that labor cannot be used in other sectors. Thus,
the growth-maximizing policy is also the optimal policy. In this section, we extend
the model to show that under reasonable assumptions an excess of monopoly power
may harm growth. Moreover, we relate this analysis to the process of development
and we highlight how inappropriate competition policies may slow down technological
convergence.
While most of the existing literature on competition policy and growth analyzes the
process of innovation in the industrialized world, recent research has shifted its focus
to the relationship between competition policy and technological convergence in the
development process. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) argue that in countries
behind the technological frontier there is a trade-o¤ between the innovation and imita-
tion activities carried out within rms. They argue that investments and the adoption
of well established technologies through imitation are fostered by long-term relation-
ships between rms, between rms and banks or between rms and their managers. In
contrast, turnover and exible contractual arrangements favor the selection of entrepre-
neurial skills, ultimately enhancing rmsinnovative capabilities. Industrial policy, and
in particular competition policy, determine what contracts are chosen in equilibrium.
In particular, barriers to competition strengthen the position of insider rms and their
managers. While harming the selection of the most productive rms, this policies can
promote investments in poor economies where credit market imperfections are the most
binding constraint. For this reason, barriers to competition may have been useful to pro-
mote growth and technological convergence in countries such as France, Italy, Korea and
Japan that adopted interventionist industrial policies after World War II (see Zilibotti
(2008) for more discussion), as long as they were su¢ ciently far from the technology
frontier. However, the theory emphasizes that as economies approach the technology
frontier, more market-oriented strategies implying lower barriers to competition are nec-
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essary to promote further technological convergence. This is because at this later stage
technological convergence requires more human capital and selection to foster both gen-
uine innovation and the adaptation of more sophisticated technologies. Such change of
strategy can clash with the interests of insider rms that throve due to the high barriers
to competition.
The theory described above breaks with the stark prediction that high monopoly
power is best for growth. Moreover, it argues that as growth and technology adoption
become more human-capital intensive the optimal policy becomes more pro-competitive.
However, neither their theory nor the model of directed technical change presented in the
previous section deals with human capital accumulation. In this section, we augment
the model of directed technical change with educational investments. The extension
identies a mechanism by which excessive monopoly power has a negative e¤ect on
innovation and growth. In particular, when rms appropriate too large a share of the
surplus, all other factors lose and in particular the return to human capital investment
falls. Thus, the optimal policy depends on the extent to which countries rely on human
capital accumulation for their growth and development process.
Since our argument applies to both innovation and technological convergence, we
restrict attention to the one-country version of the model. We assume that H can be
accumulated. To obtain a balanced growth path where AL, AH and H grow at the same
rate, we modify the technology in the H-intensive sector by assuming that
YH = EH
Z AH
0
yH (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where EH  (AH)
  1
 1 H :12 For simplicity, we set Z = 1. Given symmetry and full
employment, we obtain that YH = H1 A

H .
Total prots in the H sector are equal to a fraction 1=~ of revenue. Thus, prof-
its per rm are H = PH (H=AH)
1  =~ while the wage per unit of human capital is
wH = PH
 
1  1
~
  
AH
H

: Along the balanced growth path, the return from investing in
innovation must be equal to the return from investing in human capital:
H

=
PH
~

H
AH
1 
= r =
PH
ce

1  1
~

AH
H

=
wH
ce
;
where ce is the cost of education (acquiring one unit of H). This arbitrage condition pins
down the balanced growth ratio:
h  H
AH
=
~   1
ce
: (27)
12This assumption on EH may appear restrictive. We view it as a reduced-form representation of
more realistic models that allow us to keep the analysis within the framework of the previous sections.
For instance, a production function of the form:
YH =

H
AH
1  Z AH
0
xi di
where intermediates xi are produced using the numeraire good, would produce very similar results. See,
e.g., Dalgaard and Thustrup (2001) for a similar specication of technology.
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Finally, as in the benchmark model, relative prices along the balanced growth path are
determined by the indi¤erence condition between innovating in the two sectors:
H
L
=
PH
PL
h1 
L
= 1! PH
PL
=
L
h1 
Using this, together with (16), we can solve for the prot levels:
H =
h1 
~
"
1 +

L
h1 
 1#1=( 1)
and L =
L
~
"
1 +

h1 
L
 1#1=( 1)
Note that, for a given h, prots are a negative function of ~. Given that prots
are a share 1=~ of revenues, a low ~ tends to increase monopoly rents. However, a
high prot rate (low ~), compresses wages and thus the return to human capital. This
has the e¤ect of reducing the equilibrium level of h and hence of prots, because hu-
man capital is a complementary factor in production. This second e¤ect implies that,
when human capital can be accumulated, maximizing monopoly power is no longer the
growth-maximizing policy. The growth-maximizing degree of competition depends on
how important human capital is in production.
To see this, substitute (27) into L; then use r = L= and (2) to solve for the
balanced growth rate:
g =
1
~
"
L 1 +

~   1
ce
(1 )( 1)# 1 1
  
What ~ maximizes g? To answer this question, consider the following cases:
1. If  ! 1 or ce ! 1 or L is very high, meaning that human capital is relatively
unimportant or very scarce, then g is decreasing in competition, ~, as in the bench-
mark model. Thus, in developing countries where human capital accumulation is
not an important engine of growth, some anti-competitive arrangements may be
growth-enhancing.
2. If instead L ! 0, then it is easy to show that g is maximized for ~ = 1=.
That is, the more relevant human capital is in production (low ), the lower the
growth-maximizing level of monopoly power.
More generally, the more countriesgrowth relies on human capital accumulation, the
more they need competitive markets. For instance, in a poor economy in transition where
human capital investments are not protable yet and where growth relies entirely on the
adoption of foreign technologies, protecting monopoly rents speeds up the convergence
path. Once investment in human capital starts, however, too high monopoly rents can
become a barrier to growth.
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3.4 Distortions and Technology Misallocation
The analysis of sections 3.1 and 3.2 has shown that, conditional on the cost of innovation,
the decentralized equilibrium achieves an e¢ cient direction of technological development
in the North. Clearly, this result hinges on the lack of distortions that are asymmetric
across sectors. A recent literature has emphasized that resource misallocation may
be an important source of productivity di¤erences across countries (see, e.g., Parente,
Rogerson and Wright (2000), and Hsieh and Klenow (2007)). According to this view,
even though high-productivity technologies are adopted by some rms in developing
countries, these rms must compete on unequal grounds with local rms using less
productive technologies. This can be due to political linkages or other distortions. For
instance, Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2008) construct a model focusing on China
where discrimination in the nancial sector allows large state-owned rms to survive
and compete for the allocation of labor and capital with technologically more advanced
private rms.
This literature has generally ignored another channel through which discriminatory
policies a¤ects aggregate productivity, i.e., its inuence on the direction of technical
progress. To study this e¤ect, recall that, in each sector, the prot share is 1=: Assume
now that  varies across sectors. Then, equation (12) becomes:
H
L
=
LPHZH
HPLL
=
L
H

AH
AL
  1


ZH
L
1  1

(28)
Consider the North, rst. Imposing the arbitrage condition that innovation be equally
protable in both sectors, L
r
= H
r
=  and using (28), we can solve for the equilibrium
technology:
ANH
ANL
=

NL
NH

ZHN
LN
 1
: (29)
We have already seen that e¢ cient technologies, equating the marginal product of in-
novation across sectors, require A
N
H
ANL
=

ZHN
LN
 1
. Comparing this with (29) shows that
as long as L 6= H ; the e¢ ciency condition is not satised and this implies a low ag-
gregate productivity. The reason is that less competitive sectors, where rents are more
protected, attract too much innovation relative to the social optimum.
In the South the e¢ ciency condition for the direction of technology adoption is dif-
ferent from that in the North, as the marginal cost of technology adoption is endogenous
and di¤ers across the two sectors. In particular, using (18), the marginal costs of tech-
nology adoption are:
@
 
cHA
S
H

@ASH
= cH (1 + ) and
@
 
cLA
S
L

@ASL
= cL (1 + ) : (30)
E¢ ciency then requires
 
@Y S=@ASH

=
 
@Y S=@ASL

= cH=cL. Using (30) and (18), it is
easy to show that the e¢ cientASH=A
S
L coincides with (20), proving that the laissez-
faire equilibrium achieves an e¢ cient direction of technology adoption. Thus, as in
the case of the North, any asymmetric markup policy leading to a deviation from (20)
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would introduce distortions.13 However, equations (30) also make clear that the social
marginal costs of adoption are higher than the private costs, cL and cH . The reason
is that a rm adopting a new technology increases the cost of future adoption. This
negative externality is ignored by decentralized rms and leads to an ine¢ cient level of
investment in technology adoption.
4 Globalization, Technology and the Wealth of Nations
The forces of globalization have always been seen as major determinants of the wealth
of nations and of the world income distribution. Ever since David Ricardo, traditional
trade theory has focused on understanding the sources of the gains from trade and their
distribution, for a given technology. However, to the extent to which technology is
the prominent factor in determining cross-country income disparities, the focus of the
literature has shifted to the role of trade as a vehicle of technology transfer. Moreover,
trade and globalization can have rst-order e¤ects the direction of technological change
which can have signicant e¤ects on productivity di¤erences. This section is devoted
to reviewing some of the key mechanisms whereby globalization can alter cross-country
income disparities through its impact on the direction of technological change.14
We consider two aspects of globalization: trade in goods and international labor
mobility (migration). To study the former, we start by relaxing the assumption that
nal goods are not traded in the benchmark two-factor model of endogenous technical
change. We then use the model to illustrate the e¤ects of both North-South and North-
North trade on technology and relative income. A key nding of this exercise is to
show that, as argued by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Epifani and Gancia (2008a),
globalization can lead to skill-biased technical change that benets disproportionately
skill-abundant countries. Next, we study how trade, specialization and migration af-
fect the world income distribution in a single factor version of the model. We will see
that, once technology is endogenized, trade and migration can have both equalizing and
unequalizing e¤ects. In particular, as emphasized by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002),
trade can promote technological convergence across countries through changes in rela-
tive prices (the terms of trade). International labor mobility, instead, can either amplify
or dampen income and technology di¤erences, depending on the value of the elasticity
of substitution between goods.
4.1 North-South trade and skill-biased technical change
We start by allowing for trade in nal goods, YL and YH , in the North-South model of
section 2. This exercise, rst discussed in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), shows that
trade leads to skill-biased technical change, which in turn can cause divergence in output
per worker across countries. The intuition for this result is that trade with skill-scarce
countries increases the price of skill-intensive goods and this accelerates the introduction
13A more detailed analysis of asymmetries in market power as a source of ine¢ ciency can be found
in Epifani and Gancia (2008b).
14For a more extensive treatment of the links between trade, innovation and growth see Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Ventura (2005).
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of skill-complement innovations. As a consequence, the skill premium increases. Given
that the North is skill-abundant, it benets relatively more from such a change in factor
prices.
To see this, suppose that a skill-abundant North and a skill-scarce South are inte-
grated into a single market for YL and YH , that we call the World. In this scenario, the
relative price of goods (10) is determined by world demand and supply:
PH
PL
=

ALL
W
AHZHW
 1

; (31)
where AH and AL are assumed to be identical everywhere (i.e., we consider the case of
no barriers to technology adoption in Southern countries,  ! 1), while HW and LW
are the world endowments of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Suppose now
that LW increases, because unskilled-labor abundant countries like China and India join
the world trading system. Not surprisingly, equation (31) shows that the immediate
e¤ect, for a given technology, is a rise in the relative price of the skill-intensive good.
But what happens once technology is allowed to adjust?
Recall from (12) that the protability of a skill-complement innovation depends both
on the size of its market, which is proportional to the skill endowment of the North, and
the price of the skill-intensive good. Given our assumption that IPRs are not protected
in the South, the increase in LW due to globalization does not a¤ect the market for
innovations, because inventors continue to sell their blueprint in the North only. Hence,
the increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods unambiguously increases the
relative protability of skill-complement innovations:
H
L
=
PHZH
N
PLLS
=
ZHN
LN

ALL
W
AHZHW
1=
(32)
This change in the relative incentives to innovate leads to a transition with skill-biased
technical change along which AH=AL grows, until a new balanced growth path is reached.
In the new long-run equilibrium, innovations must be equally protable in both sectors
(H = L). Imposing this condition, we obtain:
AH
AL
=

ZHN
LN

LW
ZHW

; (33)
which shows that an increase in LW makes technology more skill-biased.
The e¤ect on the skill premium can be found from (11):
wH
wL
=
PHZAH
PLAL
=

ZHN
LN
 1
LW
HW

; (34)
where we have used (31) and (33). Intuitively, in the new balanced growth equilibrium,
skilled workers earn a higher wage, not just because they are perceived as scarcer, but
also because technologies are more skill-biased.15
15Comparing (34) to (11), it is immediate to verify that the endogenous reaction of technology
amplies the e¤ect of North-South trade on the skill premium. This point is made in Acemoglu (2003),
where the implications for skil premia across countries are studied extensively.
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What are the implications of this technological adjustment for North-South income
di¤erences? Given that trade creates a single market for goods, it equalizes both com-
modity and factor prices across countries (note that full specialization is ruled out by
the assumption that each sector employes a specic factor.). Thus, the relative income
(or productivity) per e¤ective unit of labor of a Northern economy with endowments
LN and HN and a Southern country with endowments LS and HS can be expressed as:
yN
yS
=

ZHS + LS
ZHN + LN

LN + !HN
LS + !HS

;
where !  wH=wS is the skill-premium. A simple derivation shows that a higher skill-
premium increases yN=yS as long as the North is skill abundant:
@
 
yN=yS

@!
> 0 i¤
HN
LN
>
HS
LS
: (35)
Intuitively, a country benets relatively more from an increase in the reward of its
abundant factor. We therefore conclude that skill-biased technical change induced by the
increase in LW (globalization) amplies the income gap between Northern and Southern
economies.
4.2 Trade, market size and inequality
We now show that even trade integration between similar countries can have analogous
e¤ects. As argued in Epifani and Gancia (2008a), trade can raise the skill premium, and
hence income di¤erences between skill-abundant and skill-scarce economies, because
skill-intensive activities are more complex and benet more from the diversication op-
portunities o¤ered by larger markets.16 The point is made more easily in a static version
of the model in section 2.17
First, we generalize the sectorial production functions to allow for asymmetries in
the elasticity of substitution across inputs:
YL =
Z AL
0
yL (i)
(L) 1
(L) di
 (L)
(L) 1
and YH =
Z AH
0
yH (i)
(H) 1
(H) di
 (H)
(H) 1
We make the crucial assumption that  (L) >  (H), meaning that the benet from
having a wider array of intermediate inputs is stronger in the skill-intensive sector. This
assumption appears quite reasonable, as skill-intensive goods are typically more complex
and highly di¤erentiated (see Epifani and Gancia 2006 and 2008a).
Second, given that we are interested in North-North trade, we assume that IPRs
are fully enforced everywhere and we allow for trade in the intermediates, yL (i) and
16Matsuyama (2007) argues instead that the act of exporting requires more skilled labor and obtains
the similar result that trade intgration is inherently skill-biased.
17The reason why we use a static approach is that the model in this section would feature unbalanced
growth, with one sector disappearing asymptotically. In the interest of simplicity, the static version
allows us to abstract from such a complication. For the interested reader, a similar model of unbalanced
growth is build in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2007).
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yH (i). As in the previous sections, each intermediate input is produced by a monopolist
and the pricing rule (7) still applies.18 Given that the model is static, we now solve
for the state of technology, AL and AH , by introducing a xed cost of  units of labor
that each rm must pay. We can still think of it as the innovation costs required to
design a new variety. Free entry implies that the number of varieties in each sector
will increase until the operating prots made by each rm is exactly equal to the xed
cost, pzyz= (z) = wz; for z 2 fL;Hg : Together with the pricing formula (7), this
condition pins down uniquely the scale of production of each rm, yL =  [ (L)  1]
and yH = Z [ (H)  1]. Imposing labor market clearing for the world economy and
using yz yields the number of rms per sector:19
AH =
HW
 (H)
and AL =
LW
 (L)
(36)
Notice that, because rm size is constant, the number of varieties in each sector is
proportional to the world endowment of the relevant factor.
To solve for the skill-premium, we observe that the wage bill is now equal to the
revenue of a sector.20 Thus:
wHH
W
wLLW
=
PHYH
PLYL
=

YH
YL
  1

; (37)
where we have used (4). Using yH ; yL and (36) to solve for YH and YL and rearranging
(37) yields:
wH
wL
= !
 
HW ; LW

= 
 1

 
LW
 (L) 
[(L) 1]
 
HW
  (H) 
[(H) 1]
where  is an unimportant constant.
We are now in the position to study the e¤ects of trade between similar countries. In
particular, suppose that globalization brings about an enlargement of the world economy
that leaves HW=LW unchanged (yet, individual countries i may di¤er in H i=Li). This
will be the case if two sets of countries with similar aggregate endowments, say North
America and Europe, integrate their markets. To see what happens to the skill premium,
notice that this experiment is isomorphic to multiplying the endowments of both HW
and LW by a common factor  > 1. The elasticity of the skill premium to such a change
in scale is easily computed as:
@! (H; L)
@

!
=
(  1) [ (L)   (H)]
 [ (L)  1] [ (H)  1] > 0; (38)
where the positive sign follows from the assumptions  > 1 and  (L) >  (H). Thus,
an increase in market size raises the skill premium. The intuition for this result is sim-
ple. Trade allows to sustain a wider range of intermediate inputs, thereby increasing
18Note that, also in this model, trade equalizes factor prices, so that wages are identical in all the
trading countries.
19The labor marker clearing conditions are AH (yH=Z + ) = HW and AL (yL + ) = LW :
20Recall that prots are used to cover the xed costs, which are now in units of labor.
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productivity. In relative terms, however, output grows more in the skill-intensive sector,
where input variety is more valuable ( (L) >  (H)). With an elasticity of substitution
in consumption greater than one ( > 1), the higher relative productivity in the skill-
intensive sector increases its share of total expenditure and therefore also the relative
wage of skilled workers.
The implications for cross-country income disparities depend crucially on which coun-
tries we consider. If we compare newly integrated countries that di¤er in size, globaliza-
tion has an equalizing e¤ect. The reason is that, being part of the same world market,
small countries now enjoy the same scale economies as large countries. However, if
we consider countries di¤ering in skill-abundance that were already integrated before
the market enlargement (e.g., inequality between European countries), the globalization
shock has an unequalizing e¤ect. This follows from the fact that the market size expan-
sion increases the skill premium and this is more benecial for skill-abundant countries.
4.3 Specialization, Migration and Technology Differences
The models discussed so far share the property that trade equalizes factor prices. Yet,
even a cursory look at international data suggests that factor rewards may be far from
being equalized. It is thus important to study the impact of trade on technology when
we deviate from Factor Price Equalization (FPE). This is done in this section, where we
analyze a one-factor version of the model in which we break FPE by assuming that each
country produces a single di¤erentiated good. We will show that, when countries are
specialized, trade may prevent income di¤erences from exploding, even in the absence
of technological spillovers. Interestingly, the lack of factor price equalization has the
additional implication that workers have incentives to move towards high-wage countries.
By exploring this possibility, we also briey discuss how migration may shape technology
and the wealth of nations. Perhaps surprisingly, we will see that migration can either
be an equalizing or unequalizing force.
Assume that there is only one type of labor (L) and that the world economy is
populated by two countries only, North and South, producing di¤erentiated goods:
Y =
h
Y
 1

N + Y
 1

S
i 
 1
where YN is the nal good produced in the North and YS is the one produced in the
South.21 Sectorial production functions are:
YS = ES
Z AS
0
yS (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
and YN = EN
Z AN
0
yN (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
where ES  (AS)
 2
 1 (EN  (AN)
 2
 1 ). Notice that AN and AS now capture the state
of technology in the North and South, respectively. Thus, the two countries benet
21Equivalently, one can assume LN = 0 and HS = 0. In both cases, countries produce di¤erentiated
goods, as in the Armington model. Complete specialization can also be derived as the equilibrium
outcome of more general models. For example, Bonglioli and Gancia (2008) obtain specialization by
adding Ricardian comparative advantage in a model of endogenous technical change with a continuum
of goods.
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from di¤erent technologies that evolve independently. The rest of the model, however,
is essentially identical to the benchmark case.
Given that there is only one factor, per capita income di¤erences are now summarized
by the relative wage, wN=wS. To nd it, we can use equation (11) with the appropriate
change of notation:
wN
wS
=
PHYHLS
PSYSLN
=

AN
AS
1 1= 
LS
LN
1=
; (39)
where LN and LS are the labor endowments of the North and South, respectively. It is
instructive to compare this with the relative wage in autarky, where PN = PS = 1:
wN
wS
=
AN
AS
;
Note rst that, so long as  > 1, trade tends to reduce the e¤ect of technological
di¤erences, AN=AS, on relative income. The intuition for this result is that terms of
trade movements (PN=PS) create productivity spillovers whereby high productivity in
one country also benets the trading partner: after trade opening, demand for the good
produced by the low-income, low-productivity country increases and this leads to a
favorable change in the relative price PN=PS. Second, under free trade, small countries
tend to be relatively richer, because the price of their products is relatively high. This
result, that is typical in trade theory, may no longer hold when technology is endogenous.
To solve for the equilibrium productivity gap, AN=AS, consider the R&D sector.
We assume that the cost of designing a new intermediate input is N for the North
and S for the South, with N < S. This captures the higher R&D potential of the
North. A rst important result is that trade based on specialization prevents AN=AS
from exploding. The intuition is that an increase in AN=AS leads to a fall in the relative
price of Northern products PN=PS and this discourages further innovation in the North.
In other words, for the same reason why in Section 2 the skill-bias AH=AL settles to an
equilibrium level, the productivity gap here converges to a constant value. To nd it,
we impose the familiar R&D arbitrage condition, N=N = r = S=S: Analogously to
(13), this condition yields:
AN
AS
=

S
N

LN
LS
 1
(40)
which, together with (39), implies:
wN
wS
=

S
N
 1
LN
LS
 2
: (41)
With free trade, countries with a better R&D technology (low ) are relatively richer,
but the world income distribution is stable in the sense that both countries grow at the
same rate.
On the contrary, in autarky the growth rate of each country is determined indepen-
dently. Using (17) with the appropriate change of notation we get:
gN =
LN
N
   and gS = LS
S
  :
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Thus, so long as LN=N 6= LS=S, countries in autarky are on a divergent path. This
result, that trade helps to sustain a stable income distribution through changes in rela-
tive prices, was rst emphasized by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) in a model of growth
through capital accumulation. Our analysis extends their nding to a model with tech-
nological change.22
A second interesting result concerns the e¤ect of population size on income di¤er-
ences. While (39) shows that small countries tend to be richer because they enjoy high
export prices, equation (41) suggests the e¤ect of country size to be more complex once
technology is endogenous. The new mechanism at work is that larger markets attract
more innovation (see equation 40). When  > 2, the market size e¤ect dominates the
adverse relative price e¤ect, so that larger countries are now wealthier. This nding has
important implications for the impact of migration on income di¤erences. To see this,
assume that workers move towards the country with higher wages, but that mobility is
imperfect, so that some workers are always left in both nations. For example, this could
be the case if workers have heterogeneous mobility costs. In this scenario, the e¤ect of
migration depends crucially on the value of . If  < 2, migration is an equalizing force:
workers move to the country where they are scarce and this tends to reduce wage dif-
ferentials. On the contrary, if  > 2, the endogenous reaction of technology implies that
migration increases the relative wage of the recipient country. It follows that workers
move to the country where they are abundant. In this case, migration is an unequalizing
force that can make a symmetric equilibrium unstable and give rise to multiple equilib-
ria: as workers move to one country, the local wage increases and this attract further
workers. Models of this type, emphasizing how globalization can generate a cumulative
process of uneven development have been proposed, among others, by Matsuyama (1995
and 2004) and Krugman and Venables (1995).
5 Conclusions
Technology is the most important element in explaining cross country income di¤er-
ences. In this paper, we have illustrated how theories of directed technological change
and adoption can help explain why some countries are so much more productive than
others. Rather than providing an exhaustive survey, we opted for building a workhorse
model that is rich enough to encompass some, albeit certainly not all, of the most credited
theories of TFP di¤erences. In particular, we have discussed three possible explanations:
technological inappropriateness, barriers to technology adoption, and technological inef-
ciencies due to misallocations of resources within countries. We have also studied how
various aspects of globalization can a¤ect technical change and productivity di¤erences.
Despite important advances made in the literature in recent years, several questions
remain open. Among them, two issues are particularly relevant. First, our focus on
technology has led us to abstract almost entirely from other sources of growth. Inte-
22The result that trade opening generates convergence depends on the absence of technology transfer
in autarky. Bonglioli and Gancia (2008) show that, when the South can copy the technology of the
North, trade can lead to divergence: as countries specialize in di¤erent sectors, R&D become more
concentrated on the goods produced by the North. Thus, trade-induced specialization can shift the
direction of technical progress in favor of rich economies.
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grating physical and human capital accumulation into models of endogenous technical
progress and studying their interaction in explaining productivity di¤erences seems a
fruitful avenue for future research. Second, one of the most important remaining chal-
lenges is to quantify the empirical merits of the complementary mechanisms illustrated
in this paper. We hope that the unied theoretical framework that we have proposed
can prove useful to make progress in these crucial tasks.
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Figure 1: Skill-biased technical change after an increase in HN 
time
time
time
t0 
t0 
t0 
T
T
T
ln AH 
ln AL 
(wH/wL)S 
(wH/wL)N 
yN/yS 
1
